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1 The attorneys for petitioner have been acting pursuant to 
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forma pauperis, and the judges of this court are in debt to 
those attorneys.  We also thank the K&L Gates law firm for 
permitting them to offer their service.  Lawyers who act in 
that capacity fulfill the highest service that members of the 
bar can offer needy parties and the legal profession. 
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_____________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
_______________ 
 
Sloviter, Circuit Judge. 
 This case gives this court another opportunity to 
analyze the meaning of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude 
(“CIMT”), a provision of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“INA”), INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); 8 U.S.C § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).2  Before we reach that issue, we must 
decide whether the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), as affirmed by 
                                              
2 The IJ had authority to order Mayorga removed from the 
United States following proceedings conducted pursuant to 
INA § 240; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.  The BIA had jurisdiction to 
hear Mayorga’s appeal pursuant to INA § 103; 8 U.S.C. § 
1103, and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.  We have jurisdiction to review 
a final removal order from the BIA pursuant to INA § 
242(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Because one ground for 
Mayorga’s removal is his conviction for a CIMT, our 
jurisdiction is limited by the REAL ID Act to “constitutional 
claims or questions of law” raised by the appeal.  Roye v. 
Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation 
omitted); see INA § 242(a)(2)(D); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  
The question of whether Mayorga’s conviction was for a 
CIMT is a question of law.  We review constitutional and 
legal questions de novo, though “subject to the principles of 
deference articulated in Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).”  Pierre v. Att’y 
Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), was correct in 
finding that Petitioner Rene Montes Mayorga (“Mayorga”) 
had violated a statute that categorically involves moral 
turpitude by firearms dealing without a license, thereby 
rendering him inadmissible for life.3  Assuming the IJ is 
correct in her determination that Mayorga is inadmissible for 
life under that statute, we must next consider whether that 
determination results in an “adverse consequence” for 
Mayorga, even though he is otherwise inadmissible and 
removable on the basis of an uncontested ground.  Finally, if 
we do decide that the IJ erred in finding that Mayorga had 
committed a CIMT and agree with the appellant that the 
CIMT finding would result in an adverse consequence so that 
this case presents an Article III, § 2 case or controversy, we 
must determine whether to decide the legal issue ourselves or 
to remand this case to the BIA.  We turn to consider these 
difficult issues.   
 
 
 
                                              
3 While INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) does not explicitly state that 
an alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude is barred from admission to the United States “for 
life,” such an alien is rendered inadmissible from the time of 
the conviction (assuming that narrow exceptions found in 
INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), which are not relevant here, do not 
apply) unless a purely discretionary waiver is granted.  
Despite the lack of explicit language, the consequence of a 
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a lifetime 
ban on admission to the United States in nearly all cases, and 
the decisions so hold.  See, e.g., Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 
739 (7th Cir. 2008).   
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I. 
 
 Mayorga is a native of El Salvador.  He entered the 
United States as a teenager in 1988 without inspection and 
without being paroled.  Though there is some dispute about 
the exact events triggering Mayorga’s flight to the United 
States, it is clear that a desire to flee the then on-going civil 
war in El Salvador was a precipitating cause.  Mayorga filed 
an application for asylum in 1995, and has had work 
authorization since that time.4  He is married to a U.S. citizen 
and has five children under the age of fifteen—three 
biological children and two step-children.  All of the children 
are U.S. citizens. 
 
 On June 16, 2010, Mayorga pled guilty in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California to 
engaging in the unlicensed business of firearms dealing, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§922(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2).  See App. 8.  
Mayorga was sentenced to forty-six months in prison for the 
offense, eventually serving only seven months of the sentence 
in federal prison in California.  On February 24, 2012, the day 
he was released from prison, the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) served Mayorga with a notice to appear 
(“NTA”) before an IJ for removal proceedings under INA § 
240.  The NTA alleged that Mayorga was inadmissible, and 
therefore removable from the United States on two grounds: 
first, under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. §1182 
(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United States without 
having been admitted or paroled, and second, for having been 
convicted of a CIMT under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  
                                              
4 It is not clear from the record below why Mayorga’s original 
asylum application never proceeded to a merits hearing. 
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Mayorga’s conviction relating to the unlicensed business of 
firearms dealing was the basis for the CIMT charge.  DHS 
determined that Mayorga should be detained during the 
proceedings and he was held in a detention center in Newark, 
New Jersey during his removal proceedings.  Mayorga 
remains detained pending removal in the Etowah County 
Detention Center in Gadsen, Alabama, pursuant to INA § 
241(a)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).   
 
 At his removal hearing before the IJ, Mayorga 
conceded his removability under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) as an 
alien present in the United States without having been 
admitted or paroled, but contested his removability for having 
been convicted of a CIMT.  Mayorga also applied for 
cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, asylum, 
withholding of removal, and withholding of removal under 
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  The IJ denied each 
of Mayorga’s applications.  She noted Mayorga’s conceded 
removability under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), and held that 
Mayorga had been convicted of a crime which was 
categorically a CIMT.  The IJ denied Mayorga’s application 
for cancellation of removal on the ground that Mayorga had 
been convicted of an offense under INA § 212(a)(2) (crimes 
involving moral turpitude).  INA § 240A(b)(1)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b)(1)(C).5  The IJ held that because Mayorga had been 
                                              
5 Even if we conclude that Mayorga’s crime was not 
categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, he would 
likely be ineligible for cancellation of removal under the 
“person of good moral character” requirement.  See INA § 
240A(b)(1)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B) and INA § 
101(f)(7); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7) (“For the purposes of this 
chapter — No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a 
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imprisoned for seven months, he could not meet the “person 
of good moral character” requirement for voluntary departure.  
INA § 240B(b)(1)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B).  The IJ also 
denied Mayorga’s applications for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and withholding of removal under the CAT.6 
 
 Mayorga appealed the IJ’s denial of cancellation of 
removal on the basis that he had been convicted of a CIMT to 
the BIA.  The BIA issued a brief opinion which did not 
discuss whether Mayorga’s crime was categorically a CIMT, 
but which did agree with the IJ that Mayorga’s conviction did 
render him ineligible for cancellation of removal.  See App. 
22-25.   Mayorga appealed the BIA’s decision to this court. 
 
II. 
 
 The Attorney General argues that because Mayorga is 
concededly removable on the uncontested charge as an alien 
present in the United States without being admitted or 
paroled, we should not reach the question of whether his 
conviction is a CIMT.  (Appellee’s Br. at 13)  Inasmuch as 
the question of the justiciability of Mayorga’s claim is a 
                                                                                                     
person of good moral character who, during the period for 
which good moral character is required to be established, is, 
or was — . . . one who during such period has been confined, 
as a result of conviction, to a penal institution for an 
aggregate period of one hundred and eighty days or more. . 
.”).  
6 As Mayorga does not appeal the IJ’s determination on his 
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
withholding under the CAT in the proceedings before this  
court, we need not address those issues. 
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threshold issue, we need to discuss it before turning to the 
subsequent questions.  At the outset, we recognize that 
Mayorga conceded that he was removable as an alien present 
in the United States without having been admitted or paroled; 
moreover, his term of imprisonment prevents him from 
meeting the “good moral character” standards for cancellation 
of removal and voluntary departure.  Mayorga thus faces 
removal and a ten-year bar on returning to the United States 
regardless of whether his conviction was for a crime which is 
categorically a CIMT.   INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I), (II); 8 
U.S.C. §1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I), (II).7  Therefore, even if we 
decide that Mayorga’s conviction was not for a crime which 
is categorically a CIMT, our interpretation of a CIMT will not 
have an immediate impact on his ability to remain in or return 
to the United States.  The government, however, contends 
that any decision we might issue in this case is a disfavored 
advisory opinion.  We do not agree. 
 
 The Supreme Court has held that “collateral 
consequences” can justify a suit when the consequences 
would lead to “concrete and continuing injury.”  See Spencer 
v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998).  Injuries that are merely 
speculative could not justify suit in cases such as this one, 
where the most immediate and direct harm that flows from a 
CIMT conviction—removal from the United States—would 
apply anyway.  Although Mayorga would be inadmissible for 
a significant period of time on the basis of either ground for 
                                              
7 This ten-year bar is waiveable on the consent of the 
Attorney General, but such waivers are not common, and are 
granted only as a matter of discretion.  This use of discretion 
is not reviewable by a court.  INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).    
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removal, the additional harm caused by a lifetime ban, as 
opposed to a ten-year bar, is certainly “concrete and 
continuing,” meeting the standard set out in Spencer.  
Furthermore, there is nothing “speculative” about the 
difference between a lifetime ban and a ten-year bar.   
 
 The significant, concrete, and continuing detriment 
that Mayorga faces if we approve the IJ’s determination that 
his crime was categorically a CIMT refutes the government’s 
contention that any ruling on this matter would be a mere 
advisory opinion.  As noted, if the crime Mayorga was 
convicted of is categorically a CIMT, he faces a potential 
lifetime ban on admissibility to the United States.  INA § 
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).8  In contrast, if Mayorga is “merely” 
removable for being present in the United States without 
having been admitted or paroled, he would be eligible to seek 
admission after ten years.  INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii).  The 
difference between these scenarios is not speculative.9 
                                              
8 See note 3, supra. 
9 The Dissent appears to suggest that we should await the 
expiration of the 10-year ban which would follow from 
Mayorga’s illegal presence offense before considering the 
CIMT issue. This ignores our recent opinion in Cadapan v. 
Att’y Gen., No. 13-1944, 2014 WL 1064135 (3d Cir. May 9, 
2014). The path proposed by the Dissent would be 
incompatible with Cadapan, where the BIA argued, and we 
held, that we had reason to address whether an alien, 
concededly removable on other grounds, had been convicted 
of an aggravated felony because of this determination’s 
“impact on his…ability to re-immigrate to the United States 
after removal.” Id. at *1 n.1.”  Our opinion was 
unanimous. 
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 Mayorga also easily meets the requirement set out in 
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990), 
that “a litigant must . . . be threatened with[] an actual injury 
traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a 
favorable judicial decision” (citations omitted).  Here 
Mayorga is threatened with a lifetime ban on reentry to the 
United States—surely an “actual injury”—which would be 
traceable to the IJ’s decision on the CIMT charge, and would 
be redressable by a favorable decision from this court.  As the 
Supreme Court has elsewhere noted, when “the plaintiff is 
himself an object of the action . . . at issue . . . . there is 
ordinarily little question that the action . . . has caused him 
injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action 
will redress it.”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
561-62 (1992).10 
 
 The government further contends that any harm to 
Mayorga is made “less concrete and more tenuous” by the 
fact that he could apply for a waiver of inadmissibility.  
                                              
10 The Dissent claims that Mayorga fails to meet the causation 
requirement set out in Lujan.  This is incorrect.  If we do not 
decide this issue, the IJ’s determination that Mayorga was 
convicted of a CIMT will stand, and he will therefore likely 
be held inadmissible.  See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i). We have 
heretofore held that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply 
to agency decisions.  See Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 
340, 347-48 (3d Cir. 2010).  Inadmissibility is distinct from 
removability, and absent a decision from this court, would 
apply to Mayorga even if he had been granted voluntary 
departure, and therefore was not removed at all.   
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While such a waiver is conceivably possible, see INA § 
212(h); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), it is completely discretionary.  
Discretionary decisions by the Attorney General in this area 
are not subject to judicial review.  INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i).   
The bare possibility of a waiver cannot, therefore, render the 
harm to Mayorga “tenuous.”  The government also suggests 
that any harm Mayorga might face is “remote and tenuous” 
because any possible return to the United States by Mayorga 
would be conditional on his obtaining a visa.  Although it is 
true that Mayorga would need to obtain a visa to re-enter the 
United States, the fact that he is an immediate relative of a 
U.S. citizen (his wife), and the father of U.S. citizen children, 
makes the possibility of obtaining a visa after the passing of 
the ten-year bar a real possibility, not a mere theoretical one.  
The government’s argument here, therefore, fails as well. 
 
 This court has not yet had the opportunity to address 
the particular sort of justiciability issue raised by Mayorga, 
but when we have considered somewhat similar 
circumstances, we have consistently taken into account the 
collateral consequences of IJ decisions.  See, e.g., Steele v. 
Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 134 n.4 (3d. Cir. 2001) (“Erroneous 
conviction of an aggravated felony will have several 
continuing and serious legal consequences . . . including 
serving as a permanent bar preventing his return to the United 
States to visit his family.”).  In earlier cases such as Steele, 
however, the IJ decision that the petitioner sought to have 
overturned had not only the collateral consequence of a 
lifetime ban on entry to the United States, but also the direct 
consequence of ruling on the merits of the petitioner’s 
removal.  Steele therefore differs from the present case in an 
important way, and cannot on its own establish that 
Mayorga’s petition is justiciable.  However, while we cannot 
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and do not rely merely on Steele here, it does provide further 
support for Mayorga’s contention that significant collateral 
consequences in an immigration case, such as the lifetime ban 
on entry to the United States at issue here, render his petition 
justiciable.  See also Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 507, 510-
11(5th Cir. 2004); Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144, 149-
51 (2d Cir. 2004); Tapia Garcia v. I.N.S., 237 F.3d 1216, 
1218 (10th Cir. 2001); Chong v. District Dir., I.N.S., 264 F.3d 
378, 383-86 (3d Cir. 2001).  For these reasons, we hold that 
we may hear Mayorga’s challenge to the merits of the IJ’s 
CIMT determination, and will now turn to that issue. 
 
III. 
 
 Mayorga pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 
922(a)(1)(A), which criminalizes engaging in the business of 
importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms without the 
appropriate license, (“It shall be unlawful for any person— 
(A) except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or 
licensed dealer, to engage in the business of importing, 
manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the course of such 
business to ship, transport, or receive any firearms in 
interstate or foreign commerce”) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2), 
which provides that it is unlawful for a licensed importer, 
manufacturer, dealer, or collector to ship or transport any 
firearm across state lines to a person who does not have the 
appropriate license (“(2) for any importer, manufacturer, 
dealer, or collector licensed under the provisions of this 
chapter to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce 
any firearm to any person other than a licensed importer, 
licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed 
collector”).  No evidence about the underlying facts leading 
to Mayorga’s plea agreement with the government was 
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introduced at the removal proceedings,  although we note that 
the IJ devoted much of her opinion to the underlying facts 
Mayorga asserted in support of his various motions and 
petitions to avoid removal.    
 
  In her opinion issued at the end of removal 
proceedings, the IJ declared that Mayorga’s offense was a 
“malum in se crime which involves moral turpitude,” and that 
it was “not a petty offense because he was sentenced to 46 
months in prison,” and that Mayorga was therefore 
inadmissible.  See App. 9, 10.   The IJ further stated that  
 
The respondent’s offense is a malum in se crime 
which involves moral turpitude.  Certain commercial 
trades require a license due to their inherent potential 
risk to the public welfare, health, and safety, and the 
Court would include unlicensed dealing in firearms in 
that category.  Just as selling illegal controlled 
substances without a license creates a public risk, so 
does, by its very nature, illicit dealing in firearms 
without a license.  The respondent’s decision to 
circumvent the government’s need to track the 
dealing of weapons is categorically turpitudinous.  
See App. 9.   
 
  While “moral turpitude” has long been a problematic 
notion, both the BIA and this court have held that it is 
“conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to 
the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed to other 
persons, either individually or to society in general.”  Totimeh 
v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
Furthermore, “[i]t is the nature of the act itself and not the 
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statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral 
turpitude.”  Totimeh, 666 F.3d at 114 (quoting Matter of 
Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (BIA 1980)). 
 
 In deciding whether an alien’s criminal conviction is 
for a CIMT, we apply the “categorical” approach.  Jean-Louis 
v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 465-66 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Following this approach, we “look to the elements of the 
statutory. . . offense, not to the specific facts, reading the 
applicable statute to ascertain the least culpable conduct 
necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute.”  Id. 
(internal quotation and citation omitted).  The “possibility of 
conviction for non-turpitudinous conduct, however remote, is 
sufficient to avoid removal.”  Id. at 471.11 
 
 On its face, the crime Mayorga was convicted of is a 
regulatory/licensing offense.  While the IJ stated that 
Mayorga’s crime was malum in se, or inherently wrongful, 
such a conclusion is highly dubious, and inconsistent with 
precedent.  In Matter of Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775, 
776 (BIA 1968), a long-standing BIA precedential opinion, 
the BIA held that “the violation of a regulatory, or licensing, 
                                              
11 On occasion, we may apply a “modified categorical” 
approach, “examining the record of conviction for the narrow 
purpose of determining the specific subpart [of a statute 
containing disjunctive elements] under which the defendant 
was convicted.”  Jean-Louis,. 582 F.3d at 466 (citation 
omitted).  However, the relevant statutes in this case are not 
obviously divisible, and no record evidence, such as an 
indictment or sentencing memorandum, was introduced by 
the government in the proceedings below, further foreclosing 
this possibility. 
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or revenue provision of a statute is not a crime involving 
moral turpitude” (citation omitted).  This is consistent with 
our recent decision in Totimeh, where we held that failure to 
register under a state predatory offender registration statute is 
not categorically a CIMT, even though conduct indirectly 
regulated by the registration requirement, sexual violence, 
would be a CIMT.  Totimeh, 666 F.3d at 116.  The conclusion 
that Mayorga’s crime of conviction is not categorically a 
CIMT is further buttressed by the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2008).  There, when 
evaluating whether conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 
922(a)(1)(A) constituted a CIMT, the Seventh Circuit held 
that “Licensing of dealers . . . of firearms is a recent 
development . . . . [t]he choice between licensing (a form of 
limited control before the fact) and punishment for misuse of 
firearms is not an obvious one.”  Id. at 740. 
 
 We recognize that the intentional violation of even 
regulatory offenses might involve significant moral content,12 
but our application of the categorical approach, forecloses this 
line of reasoning in this case.  Mayorga’s crime of conviction 
is obviously one that could be violated unintentionally and in 
a non-turpitudinous manner.  For example, a dealer who 
inadvertently let his or her license lapse would be in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).  Given these facts, we cannot 
sustain the IJ’s determination that Mayorga’s crime of 
conviction was categorically a CIMT.  
                                              
12 See Stuart P. Green, Why it’s a Crime to Tear the Tag off a 
Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of 
Regulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533 (1997) (explaining 
how malum prohibitum offenses may have significant moral 
content). 
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IV. 
 
 The final question we must face is what disposition is 
appropriate.  The BIA, in its review of the IJ’s decision, 
provided only cursory discussion of the CIMT issue, and the 
government contends that we should therefore remand the 
issue to the BIA so that it may decide the issue.  Remand to 
the BIA is, in this instance, unnecessary.  The IJ, in her 
opinion, explains why she concluded that Mayorga’s crime 
was a CIMT.  Furthermore, though the BIA’s discussion was 
cursory, it did note this part of the IJ’s decision.  See App. 23.  
In particular, one element of the BIA’s opinion, agreeing with 
the IJ that Mayorga was ineligible for cancellation of removal 
under INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), specifically required accepting 
the IJ’s conclusion that Mayorga was convicted of a CIMT. 
See App. 24.   
 
 Ideally, the BIA would have provided more analysis, 
explaining why it accepted the IJ’s (erroneous) reasoning on 
the CIMT issue.  However, the record does indicate that the 
BIA recognized the issue and therefore had opportunity to 
consider it.  There is no indication in the BIA’s decision that 
it had decided not to consider the issue.  Rather, the best 
interpretation is that the BIA merely adopted the IJ’s 
reasoning, which we have concluded was not persuasive.  
When the BIA adopts an IJ’s reasoning without significantly 
adding to it, we may review the IJ’s reasoning.  See Xie v. 
Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004).  Moreover, the 
issue of the scope of a CIMT is a legal one, and this court is 
the forum that must decide legal issues.  There is therefore no 
reason to remand this case to the BIA. 
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V. 
 
 For the reasons stated above, we hold that Mayorga 
would suffer a serious adverse consequence if his crime of 
conviction were found to categorically be a CIMT, and that 
his challenge to the IJ’s CIMT ruling is therefore justiciable.  
We further hold that the IJ and the BIA were incorrect in 
finding that Mayorga’s crime of conviction was categorically 
a CIMT, and that there is no reason to remand the case to the 
BIA.  We therefore grant the petition for review and reverse 
the BIA’s conclusion that Mayorga is removable for having 
been convicted of a CIMT. 
 
Mayorga v. Attorney General United States, No. 13-2011 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Petitioner Rene Montes Mayorga seeks review of an 
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) because he 
claims it bans him from forever reentering the United States. 
In fact, the order under review has no effect on Mayorga’s 
ability to reenter the country after ten years. Because the 
order Mayorga appeals from has not caused his stated injury, 
Mayorga lacks standing to challenge the agency’s 
determination that he committed a crime involving moral 
turpitude (CIMT). For that reason, I would dismiss 
Mayorga’s petition. 
To establish standing Mayorga must show: (1) an 
injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). “To 
have standing at the appellate stage . . . a litigant must 
demonstrate ‘injury caused by the judgment rather than injury 
caused by the underlying facts.’” Tachiona v. United States, 
386 F.3d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 15A Charles Alan 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 3902, at 63 (2d ed. 1992)). Thus, 
Mayorga must show that the removal order caused the 
lifetime ban of which he complains.  
Although the Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered 
Mayorga’s removal from the United States, the lifetime ban 
was not at issue before the IJ nor the BIA. Although it is true 
that an IJ’s holding that an alien committed a CIMT could 
result in a lifetime ban, that is only so when collateral 
 2 
estoppel applies to the holding. Absent the collateral estoppel 
effect of a CIMT determination, causation is lacking.   
In this case, the IJ’s determination that Mayorga 
committed a CIMT has no collateral estoppel effect, as the 
Government rightly conceded at oral argument.1 If, after his 
ten-year ban expires, Mayorga wishes to seek reentry into the 
United States, the IJ’s CIMT determination would play no 
                                                 
1 See April 8, 2014, oral argument audio recording at 
6:54 and 8:20. The doctrine applies only when the legal issue 
was “essential to the judgment,” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979), and the CIMT 
determination was not essential to the judgment for either the 
IJ or the BIA. The Government asserted two grounds for 
Mayorga’s removability: his unlawful presence in the United 
States, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), and his conviction for a 
CIMT, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Mayorga conceded his 
removability for unlawful presence, and the IJ held him 
removable for both reasons. Mayorga then sought 
cancellation of removal, which the IJ denied for two 
independent reasons: his lack of good moral character as a 
matter of law, which Mayorga conceded, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1)(B), and his conviction for a CIMT, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1)(C). When the BIA reviewed Mayorga’s 
removal order, it decided both his removability and 
ineligibility for cancellation of removal on the same grounds 
as the IJ. The BIA did not analyze the CIMT issue, nor was it 
necessary to do so to affirm the removal order. The BIA’s 
failure to address the CIMT issue is unsurprising in light of 
the fact that Mayorga did not contest the point before the 
BIA. 
 
 3 
role in the agency’s analysis. 2  Accordingly, that 
determination did not cause his stated injury, a lifetime ban, 
so he lacks standing to petition this Court to review it. 
 The standing requirement is not an idle formality, as 
the procedural history of Mayorga’s case demonstrates. By 
requiring litigants to demonstrate injury in fact, causation, 
and redressability, courts are protected from adjudicating 
issues that are not subject to vigorous, adversarial 
presentations that inform our judgments. See Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). As I shall briefly describe, as it 
relates to the CIMT issue, Mayorga’s case was the antithesis 
of the vigorous, adversarial presentation we typically see. 
The parties gave the CIMT issue short shrift before the 
IJ. At one hearing, the Government was wholly unprepared to 
litigate the CIMT charge—arguing that the wrong crime was 
a CIMT until the IJ cut the lawyer off.  At the next hearing, 
the Government gave a nine-sentence argument, relying only 
on an unnamed, unpublished decision of the BIA.  
Unbeknownst to the Government, the Seventh Circuit had 
already reversed the BIA in that case. See Ali v. Mukasey, 521 
F.3d 737, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2008). Mayorga never countered 
the Government’s hollow argument.  Even worse, at a prior 
hearing, Mayorga actually conceded that he had been 
convicted of a CIMT (an admission the IJ declined to accept).  
                                                 
 2 Unlike this case, the legal issue appealed in Cadapan 
v. Att’y Gen., 749 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2014), was essential to 
the judgment because the alien’s aggravated felony was the 
sole ground upon which the BIA denied Cadapan “relief from 
removal.” Because it was essential to the judgment, it had 
preclusive effect, i.e., effectively imposing a lifetime ban 
from re-entry. Id. at 158 n.1. 
 4 
On this remarkably sparse record, the IJ held that Mayorga’s 
firearms crime was a CIMT. Only three paragraphs in the IJ’s 
fourteen-page decision discussed the CIMT issue, and its 
analysis adopts word-for-word the reasoning of the opinion of 
the BIA that was reversed by the Seventh Circuit in Ali. 
Following Mayorga’s appeal of the IJ’s removal order, 
the BIA said nothing about whether it agreed with the IJ’s 
CIMT analysis; it merely noted that determination in passing.  
This was no oversight by the BIA, since neither Mayorga’s 
brief nor the Government’s brief discussed the CIMT issue.3  
After losing his appeal to the BIA, Mayorga filed a 
petition for review with this Court. In motions practice before 
us, Mayorga referenced various arguments, but never asked 
us to review the CIMT issue. Instead, the motions panel 
noticed the IJ’s dubious CIMT reasoning and the Seventh 
Circuit’s reversal of the case upon which the IJ had relied.4 At 
                                                 
3 Mayorga simply did not “appeal[] the IJ’s denial of 
cancellation of removal on the basis that he had been 
convicted of a CIMT to the BIA.” Op. at 6. Rather, he argued 
that “[t]he Immigration Judge as a matter of discretion should 
have granted [him] cancellation of removal . . . based on [his] 
non serious [sic] criminal history” and the hardship on his 
family. App. at 15. Mayorga never challenged the IJ’s CIMT 
determination. 
 
4 Specifically, Mayorga filed motions for appointment 
of counsel and for a stay. Our decision on motions of this 
character turns on whether the movant has some probability 
of success on the merits. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 
434 (2009). To answer that question, we reviewed the record 
below for potentially meritorious issues.  
 5 
the same time, the motions panel recognized that the CIMT 
issue might not be justiciable, so we requested briefing on 
both the CIMT issue and its justiciability. Mayorga briefed 
both issues, but the Government demurred on the merits of 
the CIMT question, instead arguing that Mayorga’s petition 
was not justiciable, and if it were, remand to the agency 
would be appropriate. 
The Government’s demurrer to our order is 
unsurprising since it never asked the agency to impose a 
lifetime ban upon Mayorga. Rather, it simply sought his 
removal from the United States. Once Mayorga conceded his 
unlawful presence in the United States and that he had been 
incarcerated for more than six months, the Government 
achieved its objective and it had no reason to press the CIMT 
issue.  
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
